2008 Russo-Georgian War Commission
Hearing of General Mamuka Yurashvili (Kurashvili) who was the commander of the peacekeeping mission before the 2008 war erupted.
Disclaimer: Just a quick heads-up—this summary includes my own paraphrasing and condensing to make these marathon testimony sessions (we’re talking 8 hours a day!) easier to digest. If somehow you find an egregious error on my part, please let me know!
I’ve done my best to keep things accurate while trimming repetition and demagoguery. These hearings are a huge deal—not just for Georgia, but for anyone following Russian-Georgian war—so I’ll keep documenting them as much as I can.
I am also assuming some knowledge about Georgia and not everything is explained.
2008 War Investigation
A Temporary Investigative Commission to Investigate the Activities of the Regime and Its Political Officials from 2003 to 2012 by the Georgian Parliament is underway, headed by Tea Tsulukiani.
This is like a “Truth Commission” set up by the ruling party, Georgian Dream to investigate the former ruling party. This is about the very contentious topic: August 2008 war with Russia.
Today 28th of March, the person who was there to testify was General Mamuka Yurashvili (some spell it as Mamuka Kurashvili). He was the Chief of the Peacekeeping Operations Headquarters of the Joint Staff of the Georgian Armed Forces in 2008.
He was in charge of the peacekeeping mission which consisted of 20 people in the conflict zone between Georgia and what Georgians refer to as occupied territories of Georgia, which is referred to as South Ossetia. The Georgian and Ossetian villages are like a patchwork there around the border, not a clear line of separation which poses its own set of problems in war situations as you will read below.
He was asked in detail what his positions were in the military and described in detail, every day in August. Here are the main highlights. This is his version of events unless stated otherwise.
Mamuka was in charge of the Georgian Peacekeepers since January 2007. He also liaison-ed with a Russian counterpart, General commander of the Joint Peacekeeping Forces in South Ossetia, Marat Kulakhmetov (now the Russian ambassador to S. Ossetia) They would call each other to prevent escalations or resolve issues. They had a good working relationship. According to Mamuka, Marat seemed to have more problems with the Ossetian side, not the Georgian side.
Starting from August 1st there were escalations from the Ossetian side. Under the ceasefire that was signed by Georgians and Ossetians in 2004, the calibre of weapons was limited and it was illegal to have high calibre weapons. One of Mamuka’s missions was to control the kinds of weapons that were being used. He saw the calibres were increasing. Since August 1st, Georgians weren’t allowed to enter Tskhinvali anymore. He didn’t get the feeling that things were going to get worse until August 3rd. There were houses of Georgians burned. Intense shootings by Ossetians at night with higher calibre weapons.
However, it was Ossetians who had demanded that there must be intervention from the world because they claimed they were being annihilated by Georgians.
August 4th, Ambassadors from Tbilisi formed a huge caravan of about 16 cars to go to Tskhinvali. The diplomatic delegation was turned away, including the Russian ambassador.
Here is a paraphrased version of what Mamuka says:
I didn’t want to waste this opportunity of having them all there so we took them to Georgian villages to show the burning of Georgian homes and the alarming escalation in the weapon calibers used.
During the ambassadors' visit, the opposing forces wouldn't dare open fire - that much was certain. However, we couldn't complete our full investigation because the Russian ambassador refused to cooperate. I insisted they visit the cemetery near Rkinis Jvari, where the peacekeeping headquarters was located. This site was crucial evidence.
The situation was complex - while some attackers appeared to be Russian forces, many were actually Ossetian separatists. Before returning fire, identification is critical. However, ballistic evidence doesn't lie - you can trace bullet trajectories to confirm their origin.
Then he was asked what other ambassadors did, if they were also reluctant.
Mamuka said he (paraphrased)
It was up on a hill, and honestly most of them couldn't be bothered to climb up there - it was really hot that day. But we pushed them because this was important. Some did make the effort. From that spot you could clearly see all the Georgian houses that had been burned down - that's what I wanted them to witness with their own eyes.
He was asked if these ambassadors responded to witnessing all this, did they report on it, broadcast it. What followed this diplomatic mission.
Mamuka said for him this felt like a breath of fresh air. They did send a report to Brussels. The Russian ambassador also had everything written down what we reported to them. But the desired outcome was not achieved. The Ossetian side escalated even more after that.
He was asked what his relationship to his Russian counterpart, Kulakhmetov was at that point. He said the relationship was still good.
Then August 6th, paraphrased testimony of Mamuka.
In mid-afternoon, around 2 or 3 pm, two of our men were killed. The situation became extremely tense - constant gunfire, grenade explosions. One was killed and another peacekeeper was wounded, but we couldn't get medical evacuation due to the ongoing shooting. He died from his wounds.
What alarmed me most was Kulakhmetov's reaction. Normally he would offer condolences, but this time - nothing. When I told him the two were dead and asked for medical assistance, he just muttered something like "Grandmother...mother..." claiming Ossetians had died too. But we later confirmed no Ossetian casualties. He was clearly avoiding responsibility.
That's when I knew I was completely on my own. Our vehicle was blown up in the attack. The shooting was relentless. In total, twenty peacekeepers were wounded, two fatally.
Every movement was being watched - no room for error for our part. In peacekeeping, the smallest misstep can trigger catastrophe.
Our discussion was civil. I'd always maintained a good professional relationship with Kulakhmetov before, but that day I was alone.
Mamuka was not physically present on August 6th. He went to the place of incident on the 7th. Before he left, he was visiting Gori Hospital to see the wounded. He was ordered to visit there.
Mamuka adds that he was getting that same feeling he had back in 2004 - he kept having terrible scenes from Tskhinvali. He feels responsible and is determined to prevent such an outcome. He tries to ease the peacekeepers.
At this point Mamuka said he might not be able to say some things because he says he also has a duty to himself, to prevent harm to him and he is afraid of retaliation from Russians. He says this after he was asked what kinds of cars were being used and what car took him from Gori.
He was then asked if he agrees that his military position changed. He said he is military, “As a military officer, I follow orders - the distinction doesn't matter to me.” He agreed that he was also now incorporating new duties that there is a central asphalt road to Tskhinvali; he must be his responsibility.
Mamuka said he thought things were escalating as soon as August 1st. Ossetians were evacuating Tskhnivali, he learned from TV. Some Georgian residents also started getting alarmed since then.
Mamuka said on August 3rd, a tank had been used.
Could There Have Been Less Casualties with Timely Evacuation?
He was then asked if he told his higher up that if Ossetians are evacuating, and since he is the commander of the peacekeeping tasked with protecting civilians, what he told his higher up, General Zaza Gogava.
Tea Tsulukiani: If you thought you were alone, then the Georgians living there were even more alone…what did you do in this regard? This is your responsibility to care for the civilians. If you have the privileges to be in Tskhinvali and be able to communicate with others and these incidents.
Mamuka corrected that he has not been able to go into Tskhinvali since August 1st. That he was working to prevent this war until the last second. He gets upset at this time and there is a bit of conflict with the commission members and chair and him.Then it resumes civilly quickly (Georgian media found this to be the most important development and showed this very light conflict, this clip is everywhere).
Mamuka said he had been apprising Gogava since August 1st how the situation had escalated and become dangerous. He fulfilled his duties to apprise the higher ups. He doesn’t remember everything, but his superior responded that we must do everything to prevent this. He said he was reporting every shooting that took place.
He was asked if he was reporting to the civilian part, government officials? While Mamuka was in Gori, the former president Mikhail Saakashvili was there. He was asked if he was able to talk to the president about the escalating situation. Mamuka said he was unable to speak to him. There was no opportunity for him to do so. In which the chair, Tea, said Saakshvili was doing a PR visit in Gori, leaving no room for actually accruing information from the border.
He was asked if they had evacuated earlier, if there would be less casualties today.
Mamuka explained that earlier civilian evacuation would not have significantly altered the final death toll, as most fatalities occurred in Ossetian-controlled villages deep inside the conflict zone. However, he acknowledged that the number of wounded could have been reduced with timely evacuation from the villages nearer to Georgian villages. He emphasized that evacuation decisions were not under his authority but required tripartite approval through the Joint Control Commission (JCC), which included Georgian, Russian, and Ossetian co-chairs. Any unilateral Georgian attempt to organize evacuations would have been seen as a provocation. Reflecting on the events, he noted that this assessment was his retrospective analysis, as logistical and political constraints at the time made independent action impossible. He also mentioned the absence of Georgian co-chair Temur Iakobashvili of the JCC.
Sozar Subar, commission member: It is very important that the person (Iakobishvili) whose duty it was to be there day and night, came once during his entire ministry, although we remember well his statements, "CC", “CC" and there will be no "CC." In your opinion, how damaging was this statement? (Joint Control Commission, JCC is abbreviated as CC here)
Mamuka: "It was shameful, catastrophic, damaging. It has a tone of contempt and is completely unacceptable."
(in April of 2008, the JCC format was scrapped by Iakobashvili, read here)
Contested Military Plans
On the evening of August 7th, following a unilateral ceasefire announcement by Saakashvili aimed at halting separatist fire. That same night, a critical military meeting took place on Uznadze Street, attended by key figures like Kezerashvili, Merabashvili, and General Gogava, where defense strategies were reviewed—a routine procedure, according to Mamuka. He had traveled from Gori to Avnevi and back before being summoned to Tbilisi for the meeting, arriving after dark.
According to Mamuka, During the military planning meeting, the General led most of the discussion, while Mamuka offered mild critiques, emphasizing the need to prioritize mixed villages and civilian evacuations. The strategy focused on a central direction (Tskhinvali) with supporting flanks (right and left) to secure commanding heights, where firefights were most intense. The primary objective was to project power and control key terrain (more on this discrepancy of this later) rather than directly entering Tskhinvali, while secondary adjustments were made later—though Mamuka could not recall the exact reasons for these changes. He noted that officials like Vano Merabishvili remained quiet, possibly withholding input in his presence. During the meetings, he had to keep stepping out because he was getting urgent calls from the conflict zone.
As the investigation continues there are two points of contention. One is what was the actual mission of the military plans that were made and enacted. Mamuka uses the language of “Restoring constitutional order.” While he is pressed, he says, he is the one who uses this term on his own. The military mission he claims was to secure pathways to evacuate civilians from deeper territories. General Gogava said it was to destroy enemy firing posts. There were places usually in high ground where there were artillery and firing coming from which meant control of certain areas. Ossetians had many such firing posts but it seems mostly not in the city, Tkshinvali but villages. There is ambiguity to what is meant by “putting out” these firing posts. Mamuka was asked many times and ways to define the real mission of the August 7th military plans. He said that restoring constitutional order and evacuating civilians are one and the same mission. The question was asked if most of these firing posts are not in Tskhinvali, why was the military planning to go to Tkshnviali? He first said, the main mission was to go to Tskhinvali and that the “left” and the “right” wing of the military movements were all supporting the “central” direction of going to Tkshinvali. He later said, no they weren’t really going to Tkshinvali, it was an “imitation” of going to Tskhinvali.
Peacekeeping and Military Operations?
The second point of contention is how can Mamuka be both a peacekeeping commander and military leader? He originally said that he incorporated both these functions. Then he said, no I was a peacekeeper. His answers were ambiguous but then through questioning, it is revealed that he does have suspicion that he was used by the former government because he was a peacekeeper. He also hints at he was uneasy about his new role of military operations and wanted to protect the civilians, he was in charge with but felt he couldn’t directly do so.
He also said that he was noticing days before the Russian peacekeepers and the Ossetian separatists acting in concert, like they were in cahoots with each other.
On the night of the 7th of August. Here is the video from 2008 where he says “Georgian armed forces have decided to restore constitutional order in the entire region.”
Tea: A journalist approached you while you were emotional, you feel responsible for civilians because it is part of your duties and you made a statement. Your mission was to signal civilians to evacuate through your words. Saakashvili called it a "dumb statement.” You said that “constitutional order was being restored” but couldn't elaborate further because you were talking about the "incorporation of both peaceful and military duties." Why couldn't you be more direct to warn the civilians?
Mamuka: Making military or political statements without authorization is illegal.
T: This wasn't political—you were performing your peacekeeping duty by warning civilians.
M: For something like that, I needed proper channels—a press conference or official announcement. I required permission.
T: Who could grant that permission?
M: General Gogava, or the decision-making council overseeing operations.
T: Before his redeployment, you and Shalva coordinated peacekeeping and military roles. Until orders came for Tskhinvali, how did the "imitation" function work? You mentioned this earlier.
M: Later, on the 9th, I was with Russian peacekeepers, unarmed. But on the 7th and 8th? Our functions overlapped.
T: So Shalva led, and you followed? Or did you lead and Shalva followed?
M: We moved together. Civilians knew me as a peacekeeper—a "peaceful man." They trusted me
T: They used your presence to create the illusion that nothing was wrong when the civilians saw you, didn’t they?
M: There’s some truth in what you’re suggesting.
Then Tea suggested his freedom was restricted or that he was punished for his statement that was a veil to signal to the civilians to evacuate. He denied that. He said there was only an incident where a few men came up to his apartment building entrance and beat him after the war.
Mamuka said that a lot of civilians had thanked him personally that he made that statement, they were glad he warned them.
He also stated how neither he nor General Gogava ever recieved medals while other politicians (not military) did.
Diplomacy could have de-escalated
He was then asked about the popular image of fire in Tskhinvali and said that in previous testimony, this was partially confirmed by Gogava that the fire in the photo was fire unleashed by him which was ordered by Saakashvili.
When pressed about why Georgian forces would target such an area without clear military justification, Mamuka responded that operational details were impossible to verify retrospectively. There were firing points originating near Tskhinvali's outskirts - Kusireti and Kverneti regions, similar to Kustba is to Tbilisi - as in the suburbs. That these areas were being used to fire on Tamarsheni village (Georgian village). This raised questions about targeting professionalism, to which he abruptly shifted to deny Georgian use of cluster munitions ("We never used it. Russians used it").
Then the commission members asked why had 2 different politicians from the previous government falsely given reports (including to Human Rights Watch) that the Georgian side used cluster bombs when he also agreed, Georgians never used it. Wasn’t this an act of the enemy to smear the Georgian military?
There was constant tension during the hearing where Mamuka said he is not there to make political statements nor make normative statements
Question: On August 7th, when you contacted Kulakhmetov, how did he respond to your warning?
Mamuka: I was explicit with him - I said the situation in "Frisi" village would be the end of us because Ossetian forces were using rooftops to adjust their firing positions. His reply was telling: "What did you expect?" It was clear confirmation that Russian peacekeepers were permitting Ossetians to target Georgian civilians.
Question: You say you don't like normative assessments. Given your orders, how would you assess how much you were able to complete them?
Mamuka: I could have done it better.
Q: Did someone stand in your way?
M: This is more about my expectations from the Russian Federation. I think I could have done something to not get into war. I don’t ever want to repeat it.
Q:Could the war have been avoided?
M: If the diplomatic mission had gotten stronger, yes, of course. We had strong diplomats who could have been used to negotiate with the Russian Federation. But not after August 1—it was impossible. In the conflict zone, it seemed impossible.
Q: So the failure of having diplomacy that led to such a red zone like August 1st that could have been prevented?
M: Yes. Russia continued politics with war in regards to Georgia. We had strong diplomats who could have been activated.